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Rebecca Tushnet  
Why the Customer Isn’t Always Right: Producer-
Based Limits on Rights Accretion in Trademark 
James Gibson’s article Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual 
Property Law1 offers valuable insights into the extra-judicial dynamics that have 
contributed to the seemingly unending expansion of copyright and trademark 
rights over the past few decades. This Response focuses on the trademark side 
of that expansion. The theoretical basis for granting trademark rights is that, if 
consumers perceive that a mark or other symbol indicates that a single source is 
responsible for a product or service—whether through physical production, 
licensing, sponsorship, or other approval—then the law should give effect to 
that consumer perception. Trademark rights thus protect consumers from 
deception and producers from unfair competition. When it comes to expansive 
rights claims, trademark’s dual nature is its strength: core trademark doctrines 
recognize the legitimate interests of producers as limits on the licensing-based 
rights accretion that a pure consumer protection theory could justify. 
Gibson persuasively explains how producers can create licensing markets 
that have feedback effects on consumer expectations, thereby expanding 
trademark rights without changing the substantive law. It’s even worse than he 
suggests, given that trademark owners now license even traditionally taboo or 
“tarnishing” uses of their marks, such as New York City’s recent foray into 
condoms branded with subway logos2 and dual-licensed “rivalry figurines” that 
show one school’s mascot being humiliated by another’s.3 In such a pervasively 
licensed world, consumers may attribute unauthorized parodies to trademark 
 
1.  116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007). 
2.  See Richard Pérez-Peña, Wrapped in Subway Logos, Free City Condom Is a Hit, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 5, 2007. 
3.  See, e.g., Universal Shopping, Rivalry Figurines, http://www.universalshopping.com/ 
rivalry.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2007). Interestingly, the victimizer gets a larger percentage 
of the license fee than the victim.  
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owners, which would justify the owners’ control over even traditionally 
unlicensed critical speech. Yet even though consumer perceptions stand at the 
center of trademark law, trademark law has more tools than copyright law for 
resisting licensing-based rights accretion—indeed, trademark law possesses a 
comparatively rich arsenal of limiting doctrines as a consequence of the centrality 
of consumer perceptions. 
Copyright law’s interest in licensing markets arises mainly in the fourth 
factor of the test permitting “fair use” of copyrighted works.4 That factor 
considers the effect of the disputed use on existing or likely markets available to 
the rights-holder. Thus, analysis of licensing markets in copyright law has 
proceeded with relatively little consideration of such markets’ effects on 
copyright law’s overall goals of promoting “progress” and expression. 
Although courts supposedly balance the four fair use factors, they often declare 
the existence of a licensing market to be crucial, as Gibson explains. By 
contrast, trademark law must routinely consider the tradeoffs between 
consumer protection/expectation rationales and other policy goals, such as free 
competition in unpatented goods and First Amendment concerns. Gibson 
identifies important limits on trademark’s feedback loops when consumer 
perceptions do not align with actual licensing markets, but he does not spend 
much time on instances in which trademark law does not rely on consumer 
beliefs. It is true, as Gibson says, that legislation cannot itself halt changing 
consumer perceptions, but trademark law need not—and in fact does not—use 
consumer perceptions as its only guidance. 
Numerous trademark doctrines serve to cabin the ability of trademark 
owners to claim licensing rights. For example, the functionality doctrine holds 
that product features that make a product cheaper or more effective cannot be 
protected by trademark law, even if the features have a “de facto” secondary 
meaning that signals the product’s source to consumers. Thus, even though 
Nabisco’s patent on shredded wheat biscuits probably led consumers to 
assume—correctly, during the period of the patent—that Nabisco was the sole 
source of shredded wheat, when the patent expired, other competitors were 
free to produce the patented good despite that consumer belief.5 At times, 
trademark’s genericity doctrine serves the same purpose of encouraging 
competition by preventing a single producer from obtaining rights in a phrase 
that is necessarily generic even if consumers associate the phrase with the 
market leader—as with AOL’s use of “You’ve Got Mail.”6 
 
4.  17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000). 
5.  See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938). 
6.  See America Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 822 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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Likewise, trademark law’s descriptive fair use doctrine explicitly tolerates a 
higher-than-usual likelihood of confusion when a competitor uses a term that 
both describes its products and has trademark meaning for a competitor. Some 
confusion is acceptable because the payoff is greater freedom for producers to 
compete by accurately describing their products. Nominative fair use, a related 
doctrine, allows the use of a mark to identify a particular product or service if 
it’s the best way to do so, if the use is no greater than necessary, and if the user 
does nothing else to suggest endorsement. For example, in the case that first 
named the nominative fair use defense, the Ninth Circuit held that USA Today 
and Star Magazine could run for-profit telephone polls asking about readers’ 
favorite New Kid on the Block, even though those polls competed with the 
New Kids’ own for-profit telephone services and even though the ordinary 
confusion factors might seem to favor the plaintiffs. In such nominative fair 
use cases, the court ruled, confusion is unlikely as a matter of law.7 That is, the 
Ninth Circuit holds that there exists an apparently irrebuttable presumption 
that consumers are not confused, regardless of what the evidence might show 
about any particular nominative use.    
In other situations, judges presume that a defendant’s use of another’s 
trademark does not confuse consumers and does not lead consumers to believe 
that the defendant obtained permission from the trademark owner; then, the 
judges do not consider evidence that might rebut those presumptions. Usually, 
this helps add empirical punch (“There’s no confusion here!”) to normative 
conclusions that free speech or free competition outweigh any risk of 
confusion. The Second Circuit’s influential Rogers v. Grimaldi rule8 is an 
example of this reasoning. The court, relying on intuitions rather than 
evidence, held that titles incorporating trademarks are less likely to cause 
consumer confusion than other types of uses, and simultaneously held that 
First Amendment interests outweigh the likelihood of confusion when a title is 
artistically relevant and not explicitly misleading as to source or sponsorship. 
In another case, a writer wished to use characters, situations, and 
catchphrases from Amos ‘n’ Andy in a new play. CBS asserted trademark rights, 
even though it had stopped commercially exploiting the Amos ‘n’ Andy 
properties because of the negative racial stereotypes embodied in the show. 
CBS did, however, license excerpts from Amos ‘n’ Andy programs “for limited 
 
7.  See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“Such nominative use of a mark—where the only word reasonably available to describe a 
particular thing is pressed into service—lies outside the strictures of trademark law: . . . such 
use is fair because it does not imply sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.”) 
(second emphasis added). 
8.  875 F.2d 994, 999-1000 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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use in connection with documentary and educational programs”9 and argued 
that this licensing precluded a finding that it had abandoned its marks. 
The Second Circuit held that “sporadic licensing of essentially non-
commercial uses of a mark is not sufficient use to forestall abandonment. Such 
uses do not sufficiently rekindle the public’s identification of the mark with the 
proprietor, which is the essential condition for trademark protection.”10 The 
court specifically referred to the playwright’s First Amendment interests in 
creating new works based on Amos ‘n’ Andy scripts whose copyright had 
expired as a factor favoring a finding of abandonment, even though it is 
difficult to see how that interest could affect whether the public still perceived 
Amos ‘n’ Andy products as emanating from a single source. Such merger of 
prescriptive and descriptive claims about public perceptions is common in 
trademark cases; it operates to minimize the acknowledged costs of consumer 
deception resulting from free competition and free speech. In fact, the 
abandonment rule in general—which looks at whether a producer has ceased 
use of a mark without intent to resume it, rather than whether consumers still 
associate the mark with a specific source11—prioritizes free competition over 
avoiding consumer confusion. The goal is not to protect consumers, but to 
create bright lines so that producers will know what marks are free to use. 
Recently, there has been controversy over the extent to which “use as a 
mark” can limit expansive trademark concepts. For example, search engines 
have been sued for selling trademarked terms as keywords used to generate ads 
for competing products or services; the search engines are clearly not using the 
trademarks to brand their own products or services, yet some courts find 
infringement, or at least potential infringement.12 As Gibson notes, by 
requiring a plaintiff trademark owner to prove that a defendant used its 
trademark “as a mark,” courts could protect search engines from direct liability 
in this circumstance. Proponents of such a “use as a mark” requirement argue 
that keyword sales are no different from the standard supermarket practice of 
 
9.  Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 47 (2d Cir. 1989). 
10.  Id. at 48. 
11.  Concern over confusion inevitably creeps into some courts’ analysis of abandonment, and 
arguably the rule should be altered so as to explicitly consider persistent consumer 
perceptions even if that keeps unused marks unavailable for anyone to use. But the fact 
remains that the Lanham Act defines abandonment solely in producer-focused terms. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (“A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ . . . (1) When its use has 
been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred 
from circumstances. Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of 
abandonment.”). 
12.  See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 
2004); Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
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stocking house brands next to popular national brands, using the value of the 
national trademark to attract consumer attention, but only in a legitimate, 
comparative way. Gibson’s summary of the developments in 
sponsorship/approval doctrine explains why a “use as a mark” requirement is 
both attractive and difficult to manage. Under current case law, he writes, “the 
focus shifts from whether the plaintiff sponsored or approved of the defendant’s 
product to whether the plaintiff acquiesced in the defendant’s use of the 
plaintiff’s mark.”13 Thus, if consumers believe that Google needs GEICO’s 
permission to run “Sponsored Links” along with search results for “GEICO,” 
there can be infringement.14 And that infringement exists even if consumers 
understand that GEICO has no connection with any of the competing 
advertisers whose links appear in the result list. If we can imagine trademark 
owners successfully persuading consumers that any reference to a mark 
requires permission, whether in a book, a search result, or a product review, 
then trademark owners will have amazingly broad rights to control discourse 
about themselves. 
A requirement that trademark owners prove “trademark use”—that is, use 
to indicate the source or sponsorship of a product or service as a whole—seems 
to be a useful way to unite, rationalize, and expand current defenses like 
nominative fair use and descriptive fair use, as well as to preserve the 
traditional distinction between direct and contributory infringement. But the 
requirement of “trademark use” has difficulty dealing with the problem that 
consumers may reasonably believe that Coca-Cola is a sponsor of American Idol 
because its products appear on the show. If that isn’t trademark use, what is it? 
Can it be distinguished from Google’s practices, or from supermarket shelving 
patterns, in any normative way? “Normative” is the key term, because of the 
dynamic that Gibson identifies allowing trademark owners to change 
consumers’ beliefs about whether permission is required. An external 
perspective, weighing potential consumer confusion—and the harm that could 
be done by such confusion, which as Gibson points out will often be minimal—
against other interests can help us answer that question. 
It’s easy to assume that a consumer-protection focus cabins trademark 
owners’ expansive property claims. But as Mark McKenna has shown in 
chronicling the disappearance of the old rule that only direct competition could 
infringe a trademark, focusing on consumer confusion can easily lead to 
 
13.  Gibson, supra note 1, at 911. 
14.  See, e.g., Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (“[W]hen defendants sell the rights 
to link advertising to plaintiff's trademarks, defendants are using the trademarks in 
commerce in a way that may imply that defendants have permission from the trademark 
holder to do so.”). 
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expansion of trademark rights.15 Trademark law’s continued reliance on 
concepts of free competition, as well as free speech, allows it to keep consumer 
confusion from turning trademark law into a right to control all references to a 
mark. The reforms Gibson tentatively suggests to prevent excessive risk 
aversion extend rather than replace the countervailing normative principles 
that already exist within trademark law. Far too much has already been done in 
the name of protecting consumers against evanescent and irrelevant 
“confusion.” Acknowledging and fortifying trademark’s well-established 
balancing doctrines is the best way to break out of the feedback loops Gibson 
rightly decries. 
 
 Rebecca Tushnet is an associate professor of law at Georgetown University Law 
Center. Many of her works are available on her website, http://www.tushnet.com. 
She also runs 43(B)log, a weblog on intellectual property and advertising law. 
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15.  See generally Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). 
